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Getting the Better of the Bargain: Technical Intelligence, 
Arms Sales, and Anglo-Israeli Relations 1967–1974
Clive Jones
School of Government and International Affairs, IM117, University of Durham, Durham, UK
ABSTRACT
This analysis explores the nature of Anglo-Israeli intelligence 
relations between 1967 and 1974, focusing in particular on 
how the legacy of the British mandate in Palestine, the influence 
of senior British diplomats, as well as wider commercial interests 
shaped attempts by intelligence officials on both sides to move 
this relationship beyond the purely functional. Whilst Israel 
looked to barter access to recently captured Soviet equipment 
for greater collaboration with the British in weapons develop-
ment and arms sales, London demurred. Despite the urging of 
some in Whitehall, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office lim-
ited any collaboration to functional exchanges and kept them 
firmly in the shadows. The aftermath of the October 1973 war 
revealed the price paid by Britain. With Israel now dependent on 
Washington for the bulk of its military equipment, London’s 
ability to exercise any influence over Tel Aviv in reaching an 
accommodation with its Arab neighbours diminished greatly.
Reciprocity has defined some of the closest intelligence relationships between 
democratic states. Not only are such relationships functional in terms of the 
intelligence shared and distributed but equally, shared norms, values, and even 
cultures that allow more junior partners to benefit exponentially inform them 
for the most part. They are so much more than utilitarian arrangements and, 
as such, have a durability, indeed longevity, which can and does survive 
periodic friction when political masters fall out.1 It has often been noted, for 
example, that intelligence liaison and co-operation between Britain and the 
United States has allowed London to exercise influence in Washington’s 
corridors of power that its otherwise diminished status as a global Power 
would have denied.2 Equally, the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance, an Anglophone intelli-
gence consortium pooling the signals and electronic capabilities of Australia, 
Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States is perhaps the most 
notable example of an intelligence alliance built on shared cultural and 
political norms as well as common security interests.3
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By contrast, intelligence relationships between democratic states, at best 
defined as transactional, receive less attention. Such relationships, whilst 
beneficial to the actors involved, receive definition more obviously and 
regularly by cost–benefit analyses and the desire of those involved to ensure 
that benefits accruing from the intelligence given will not be less than that 
of the information sought, whether in the short or medium turn. Wider 
competing commercial or strategic hard power interests that limit the 
extent and intensity of co-operation can shape them, too. Equally, such 
arrangements are not without more abstract values, say historical experi-
ence, which can shape the nature of the interaction. This is particularly so 
where the legacy of violence between the actors in another era continues to 
exercise a pull on the memory and emotions of key decision-makers. It is 
often this legacy that limits intelligence sharing to the purely transactional, 
the grip of the ‘hand of history’ on the shoulder of the actors involved being 
too firm to easily shake off. This moves the debate over intelligence sharing 
and liaison beyond a ‘form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on 
barter’.4
One such relationship is Anglo-Israeli intelligence. Until the 1980s, histor-
ians of Anglo-Israeli relations regarded bilateral ties between London and Tel 
Aviv as, at best, cool. Powerful factors decided the nature of the relationship: 
the bloody legacy of Britain’s mandate, competing interests over the future of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and a British perception, held strongly by 
Foreign Office officials noted for their pro-Arab sympathies, that arms sales to 
Israel should not damage their perceived regional status quo and Britain’s 
increasingly beleaguered place in it.5 Despite a brief Cold War–driven flirta-
tion in the early 1950s that Israel might offer Britain use of its military bases in 
any future conflict with the Soviet Union, the two states’ interests across the 
region remained far apart. Until the 1956 Suez crisis, such was the depth of 
suspicion between London and Tel Aviv that Britain drew up contingency 
plans for attacking Israel should the Israelis threaten to destabilise Jordan. It 
was one of the major British preoccupations in putting together the invasion of 
Egypt in that year.6
This raises the issue of the extent to which negative views of Israel held by 
many in the Foreign Office influenced Anglo-Israeli ties in other spheres, 
including intelligence liaison and exchange. Some files from the 1960s and 
1970s relating to intelligence exchanges – particularly in the realm of electro-
nic warfare and cyber technologies – remain closed to public scrutiny, as do 
similar files in Israeli archives. Those released by The National Archives in 
London suggest a picture, whilst partial, as rather mixed.7 In the immediate 
aftermath of the June 1967 war, British officials in the Directorate of Scientific 
and Technical Intelligence [DSTI], a subsidiary of the Defence Intelligence 
Staff [DIS], believed a closer association with a Power that had fought against 
and defeated foes equipped largely with Soviet bloc weaponry was in the 
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British national interest. With admiration for Israel’s military achievements 
pronounced across much of Whitehall, Israeli officials, too, were keen for an 
exchange of technical intelligence on weapons design as well as future colla-
boration on research and development.8
However, wider concerns across government, not least relating to Anglo- 
Arab relations and a belief that such collaboration might upset once again 
a regional order still recovering from the effects of the June 1967 war, saw the 
renamed Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] continuing to exercise 
a policy of highly selective engagement.9 For some in the field of defence 
intelligence, this was not only a missed intelligence opportunity but also 
a squandered commercial one. More broadly, it diminished Britain’s ability 
to exercise political leverage on Tel Aviv that now looked to consolidate its 
newfound regional gains. The price paid by London came six years later. In the 
immediate aftermath of the October 1973 war, the intelligence emperor, 
Britain, had few clothes and very little with which to barter with an Israel by 
now firmly dependent upon the United States for its military and security well- 
being.
Until the Suez crisis, the view holds that intelligence liaison and sharing 
between Britain and Israel was limited. Some attributed this to the legacy of 
empire. Sir John Sinclair, head of MI6 – or ‘C’ – between 1952 and 1956, 
resisted the establishment of formal intelligence liaison precisely because his 
‘prejudices born from the brutality of the Palestinian era were unassailable’.10 
Indeed, soon after the establishment of Israel in 1948, the first MI6 officer sent 
to Tel Aviv incognito, Nigel Clive, had his cover blown soon after his arrival: 
he was quickly withdrawn. A series of MI6 officers, some of them women, 
went to Israel having been ‘declared’ to their hosts throughout the 1950s.11
The immediate run up to the Suez crisis saw some of this antipathy 
dissipate. Foreign Office officials largely opted to maintain clear diplomatic 
water from their Israeli counterparts, but a maverick group of senior MI6 
officers led by George Young, deputy director for Middle East operations, saw 
closer ties with the Israeli secret intelligence service, Mossad, as part of a wider 
regional strategy to unseat President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Sinclair, it 
seems, failed to exercise effective control over Young, who admitted to ignor-
ing his superior’s orders on the ‘working level’.12 Young established firm 
relations with Isser Harel, his Israeli counterpart, but it remains unclear if 
this intelligence relationship had any direct bearing on military plans sur-
rounding the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal zone, Operation 
Musketeer, on 31 October 1956. Britain’s intelligence appreciation of Israeli 
military capabilities certainly left London in no doubt that the Israel Defence 
Forces [IDF] would rout Egyptian forces in Sinai. This assessment by Britain’s 
Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC], however, found basis largely on careful 
analysis of open-source information, rather than any direct intelligence liaison 
with the IDF as to their actual military proficiency.13
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It was not until Sinclair resigned in the aftermath of the Suez invasion and 
replaced by Sir Dick White that liaison with Israeli intelligence was put on 
a firmer footing.14 The siren-like call of Arab nationalism threatened both 
British and Israeli interests across the Middle East, not least in the Arabian 
Peninsula where, from 1957 onwards, Britain looked to construct a new 
edifice, the Federation of South Arabia, which would protect its military base 
in Aden. Equally, local conditions allowed the Egyptians to exploit anti- 
colonial sentiment, the appeal that Nasser carried across the airwaves via 
cheaply made transistor radios that amplified the seductive appeal of Arab 
nationalism across the Middle East.
Most in the Foreign Office wanted to work with, rather than against, Nasser 
and Arab nationalism and felt the failure to do so undermined British power 
and influence in the region.15 Indeed, White regarded those mainly on the 
right wing of the governing Conservative Party, advocating a continued British 
presence in Aden and South Arabia, as being ‘motivated by a nostalgia for lost 
causes’ who wished to exact revenge against Nasser for the humiliation of 
Suez.16 Equally, Foreign Office pro-Arab bias had long shaped the scope and 
scale of British arms sales to Israel. In 1953 despite a previous agreement to do 
so, London vacillated over the sale of 30 Centurion tanks to Tel Aviv, using the 
Israeli retaliatory action against the West Bank village of Kibya as the pretext 
for rejecting the request. The underlying reason, however, was London’s treaty 
obligations to Amman: why supply British tanks for possible use against 
British troops. A similar request made by Shimon Peres, director general of 
Israel’s Defence Ministry, was also turned down; London again cited concerns 
about upsetting the military balance vis-á-vis Jordan, although Israel’s main 
military threat remained Egypt.17 Only in 1958 – following the overthrow of 
the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq – did Britain relent in its arms policy to Israel 
and release the Centurion tanks. Even then, the Foreign Office ultimately 
decided the scale and scope of these sales, contingent on Israel’s relations 
with Jordan and Tel Aviv remaining discreet about the scope and scale of its 
tank purchases from Britain.18
The case of Anglo-Israeli co-operation on ‘Operation Mango’ – a series of 
covert supply drops by the Israeli Air Force to Royalist tribesman in north 
Yemen fighting the Egyptian-backed government with the help of a British-led 
mercenary organisation – is a case in point. Even here, however, the British 
were semi-detached. The operation, for London at least, was largely a private 
initiative that used former British Special Forces as the link to Mossad. MI6 
undoubtedly remained in the loop about what was being planned – one British 
mercenary, Colonel David Smiley, reported intermittently to MI6 – but it was 
an arrangement that appeared to suit all concerned. London saw benefits in 
turning a ‘blind eye’ to an operation it felt protected British interests in Aden; 
Israel equally saw gains in bleeding an Egyptian army in Yemen that by 1965 
saw 60,000 of its troops bogged down fighting an unwinnable war.19
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Useful intelligence emerged, too. Some British mercenaries reported on the 
performance of Soviet-built Egyptian aircraft to both London and Tel Aviv, 
whilst soil samples from villages subjected to chemical weapons attack – 
mainly bombs containing mustard, chlorine, or phosgene gas – went to the 
Israelis for analysis. The impact of the mercenary operation on Egypt’s later 
combat performance in the June 1967 war remains difficult to gauge, although 
according to Moshe Dayan, a former Israeli chief of staff, the collapse of the 
Egyptian army in Sinai was in no small measure due to the erosion of its 
combat capabilities in the mountains of Yemen.20
The battering Egypt’s army endured in Yemen largely informed British 
intelligence analysis of the likely outcome of the conflict two years before its 
outbreak. In March 1965, charged with assessing all-source intelligence on 
given targets and distributing this to the relevant consumers across Whitehall, 
the JIC issued a detailed report that looked at the military balance between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours. The report has since been subject to a detailed 
historical analysis, which whilst noting several inaccuracies – not least in terms 
of Israel’s force structure and the tendency of the report to underplay effi-
ciency and quality in determining combat power – it nonetheless validated the 
core finding of the document: in any war, the Jewish state would emerge 
triumphant. Israel, the report argued, was able to realise its total combat 
power more quickly and bring it to bear more effectively than any combina-
tion of the surrounding Arab states.
The JIC assessment derived from collecting, collating, and analysing – three 
stages of the traditional intelligence cycle – open-source intelligence material 
in reaching its conclusions. The errors in assessing relative force strengths 
aside, the report’s accuracy highlighted an enduring truth about intelligence:
In order correctly to assess the probable course of action by the assessment’s subject, one 
is not compelled to first penetrate decision-making circles, not to employ elite spies, not 
to develop extraordinary means of collection . . . . It is apparently sufficient for intelli-
gence services to be properly familiar with the strength and security perception of their 
subject and to intelligently analyze parameters of time, space and geography.21
This above narrative, however, exposes a wider truth: all too often, the under-
standing of the Anglo-Israeli intelligence relationship remains limited to 
a cursory understanding of ties between MI6 and Mossad. In light of their 
respective standing at the forefront of the intelligence world, this is perhaps 
understandable. In London’s case at least, strategic appreciations of Israel, its 
capabilities, and the extent to which British foreign and defence interests could 
best be realised through closer ties with Israel, particularly in the collaborative 
realm of technical intelligence, was always a bureaucratic balance. In this case 
between, on one hand, the all source analysis produced by the JIC and, in 
particular the DIS, and on the other, the concerns of the Foreign Office always 
sensitive to Britain’s ties with the Arab states.
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The study of technical intelligence remains something of a ‘Cinderella’ 
within the ever-expanding realm of intelligence studies. Moreover, those 
studies of academic note that have appeared focus primarily on the Cold 
War.22 By contrast, little of is relatively known of how the exchange of 
technical intelligence informed relationships beyond the established alliance 
structures of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and the Warsaw 
Pact. In the case of Britain, this should come as little surprise. The sharing of 
sensitive technical data, materials, and technology with Israel, let alone its 
public disclosure, remains a delicate matter for the British. Only in 2006, for 
example, revelations showed that in 1958 Britain had allowed 25 tons of 
surplus heavy water, purchased from Norsk Hydro in Norway, sold back to 
the Norwegians, knowing that the final destination would be Israel. Some 
sought clear ‘safeguards’ from Israel over its intended use of heavy water, 
a vital component producing plutonium from spent fuel and essential for 
developing a nuclear weapon. The Foreign Office, however, felt it unreason-
able to demand such safeguards as this was a Norwegian transaction and 
responsibility rested with Oslo to demand appropriate guarantees as to its 
final use.23
Still, by 1962, Britain concluded that Israel had an active nuclear weapons 
programme based on the amount of heavy water acquired by Israel, photo-
graphs of the Dimona reactor taken covertly by the British military attaché in 
Tel Aviv, and the likely role of so many French technicians present in the 
Negev. Some even suspected that Tel Aviv might have acquired nuclear secrets 
from pro-Israel sympathisers working at the British Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment at Aldermaston. There certainly were precedents for 
such suspicions. In 1950, just two years after the founding of Israel, the 
Security Service, more popularly known as MI5, uncovered Cyril Wybrow, 
a British Jew working in the War Office’s Joint Intelligence Bureau, who had 
been passing classified information to the Israelis. He suffered immediate 
dismissal rather than prosecution, suggesting that the information divulged 
was relatively low grade.24
Suspicions of dual loyalties lingered, however. MI5 interviewed several 
British Jews over their alleged connexions to Israel. One such figure was 
Nyman Levin, just eased out of his role as head of the nuclear weapons 
programme in early January 1965 when he died of a heart attack. It was widely 
believed that he was under investigation by MI5, although British authorities 
have never released the files relevant to his case with no case proved of 
collusion with Israel.25 Still, such episodes created a wider climate of concern 
across Whitehall over how far to extend the hand of co-operation, if not 
collaboration, with Israel in matters related to technical intelligence and selling 
military equipment. What is readily apparent in this debate, however, is the 
clear divisions between what might be called the scientific and military profes-
sionals, who saw ties with Israel as not only desirable but necessary, and senior 
536 C. JONES
civil servants, notably in the FCO, who remained decidedly wary. These 
divisions played out across Whitehall in the aftermath of the June 1967 war.
There is no doubt that admiration for Israel’s victory in 1967 was wide-
spread. The British Ministry of Defence [MoD] took a particular interest – and 
delight – in what they learnt of the performance of the Centurion tanks Britain 
sold to Israel over the previous decade. Equally, with 55,000 British troops 
stationed in West Germany – the British Army of the Rhine [BAOR] – officials 
in London were anxious to glean any information they could regarding Soviet 
weaponry and, believing these to reflect largely Soviet military doctrine, the 
tactics and strategies used by the Egyptian army. Above all else, the British 
wanted access to technical intelligence, a task falling the DSTI, responsible for 
designing and evaluating new weapons systems as well as developing effective 
counter measures against existing Soviet bloc weaponry and equipment. The 
Israelis knew they had material leverage that they could exploit. If Britain – 
and other NATO countries – wanted access to captured Soviet bloc equip-
ment, Israeli knowledge was barter material for closer co-operation both in 
terms of access to particular items of British kit as well as research and 
development. What was to become apparent on the British side was that whilst 
the DSTI was responsive to such ‘trading’, other government departments, 
notably the FCO, remained more circumspect over exactly how far Britain 
could, or should jump, into a ‘technical bed’ with the Israelis.
Even before the June 1967 war, improving Anglo-Israeli ties had seen arms 
sales move beyond the purchase of just tanks. In the mid-1960s, the Israeli 
navy purchased three former Royal Navy submarines, including HMS Totem, 
renamed INS Dakar – Swordfish. The British used Totem for covert signals 
intelligence gathering in the Arctic circle off the Soviet coast. Refitted in 
Portsmouth with a conning tower that allowed for the underwater insertion 
of Special Forces, Dakar was lost on 24 January 1968 east of Crete with all crew 
on its final approach to Haifa.26 Whilst a tragic loss, this episode demonstrated 
nonetheless Israel’s continued interest in acquiring British weapons systems 
and technical intelligence. In so doing, the Israelis were prepared to trade 
technical intelligence for access to British weapons technology. Nowhere was 
this more apparent than in the realm of armoured warfare.
The IDF had already made an opening gambit to the British regarding tank 
design. In early 1968, the director of Armoured Warfare Research at 
Bovington, Bayley Pike, visited Israel and held a series of meetings with Major- 
General Israel Tal, widely regarded as the ‘Don’ of Israel’s armoured Corps. 
Tal expressed his desire to co-operate with the British on any technical matters 
related to the performance of IDF Centurion tanks during the war, not least 
the performance of their main armament, the 105 mm gun. In return, Tal 
asked permission to allow Israeli experts to probe officials at Bovington on 
issues related to innovations in armoured warfare that could be of use to the 
IDF. In particular, Israel hoped to purchase the next generation of British tank, 
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the Chieftain, and two had already reached Israel to allow their suitability for 
desert warfare to be assessed.27
This was part of a wider Israeli effort to gain access not just to British 
equipment but to Britain’s research and development facilities, in effect trad-
ing technical intelligence for technical know-how with joint Anglo-Israeli 
teams to engage in collaborative evaluation on a range of military equipment. 
A joint party of military and civilian experts from Britain visited Israel 
between 27 January and 2 February 1968 at Tel Aviv’s instigation to lay the 
groundwork for how both sides might best profit from analysis of the copious 
amount of Soviet equipment captured. The delegation expressed cautious 
optimism about reaching suitable arrangements, although it was by no 
means uniform across the British service representatives. The army in parti-
cular remained keen to extract more information regarding IDF tactics used 
against Egypt, but the Israelis proved reluctant to divulge such information 
without exacting something of similar value from the British. In particular, 
Israel hoped that with their greater weapons development capabilities and test 
ranges, Britain could be of use in helping fast track Israel’s research and 
development programmes.28
One name that began to figure prominently in this proposed exchange of 
information and wider research and development was Professor Efraim 
Katchalsky, chief scientist of the Israeli MoD and, later, under the surname 
Katzir, the fourth president of Israel between 1973 and 1978. Katchalsky hoped 
to place the exchange of technical intelligence with Britain on a more formal 
footing that would cover the exchange of information related to non- 
conventional weapons development, notably biological and chemical 
weapons.29 Already a noted scientist, he received access to one of Britain’s 
most sensitive military research facilities, Porton Down, although admission 
to more sensitive on-site areas of military research and development in 
chemical and biological weapons was necessarily restricted. Still, by offering 
London access to captured Soviet chemical warfare equipment, the Israelis 
hoped London might sign an ‘Information Exchange Agreement’ allowing 
Israel to develop what Katchalsky termed ‘defensive measures’. Such trading 
arose elsewhere: Israel offered British officials access to captured Soviet Styx 
anti-ship missiles – the Royal Navy was keen to learn of their guidance 
systems; in return, Israel asked for information in the field of Electronic 
Counter Measures.30
There were clearly advantages for both sides, and there is no doubt that the 
DSTI team visiting Israel remained keen to explore what they regarded as 
propitious grounds for future collaboration. The Israelis were prepared for 
captured equipment to be sent to Britain where it could be subjected to 
extensive field trials in the presence of Anglo-Israeli teams. This included 
‘certain chemical warfare items’, the Soviet T55 tank, as well as captured 
radios, mines, tank ammunition, anti-tank missiles, and air-to-air missiles as 
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well as detailed examination of captured papers, handbooks, and the serial 
numbers of various weapons systems. The study of intelligence often over-
looks the latter, but examination of serial numbers allows trained analysts to 
build up a picture of weapons production and development whilst also giving 
some indication of the likely size of an opponent’s military formations. The 
hope was for parallel trials in Israel. The matter went to the JIC. Whilst noting 
the possible advantages, the FCO voiced serious concerns and baulked at 
signing any formal memorandum on the exchange of technical intelligence. 
Already sensitive to the – unfounded – allegations that London had colluded 
with Washington in helping Israel crush so completely three Arab states, the 
FCO Eastern Department raised objections to any collaboration with Israel 
over research and development into chemical weapons.31 One official cited 
‘political difficulties vis a vis the Arabs if it ever became known’ that Britain 
had entered into any such agreement with Israel on such matters. Another, 
with reference to the wider eddies of the Cold War, noted ‘Communist 
propaganda would have a field day’.32 The envisaged political difficulties of 
allowing Israel access to British research and development facilities was such 
that the FCO looked to refer the matter through the JIC to the Cabinet for 
ministerial consideration.
The FCO attitude towards closer ties with Israel was shared by the foreign 
secretary, George Brown, who would resign from office soon after. Something 
of a maverick, his personal animus towards Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
reflected their respective positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas 
Wilson possessed sympathy for the Jewish state, Brown actively sought 
a reconciliation with Cairo and believed that unless Britain took a firm stance 
in support of Amman, Jordan was likely to succumb to more seemingly 
ascendant radical forces across the Arab world. It was a view shared by the 
head of the FCO Eastern Department, William Morris, who believed, ‘Britain’s 
material interests in the Arab world much more important than those in 
Israel’.33 Because the value of intelligence is often hard to measure in purely 
material terms, decision-making circles can dilute its value when wider con-
siderations are at play. Morris’ comments were certainly of a piece with how 
far Britain was prepared to go in transferring sensitive technologies to Israel. 
Whilst Tel Aviv demonstrated consistent interest in acquiring British and 
Canadian civilian nuclear technology in the late 1950s and throughout the 
1960s, London and Ottawa ‘refrained from establishing close nuclear ties with 
Israel . . . primarily because of concern that they would upset their relations 
with Arab states’.34
Still, despite growing FCO unease, the DSTI team still hoped 
a memorandum of sorts could be drawn up that related solely to evaluating 
captured Soviet weapons and equipment, which the IDF General Staff now 
tried to link to a more grandiose arrangement: access to wider British weapons 
development programmes. London met this condition with consternation and 
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indeed, also towards some officials in Israeli military intelligence who felt that 
their patient, incremental approach that built trust with their British counter-
parts best served the exchange of technical intelligence. British officials 
rejected these new conditions, and the Israelis backtracked on their insistence. 
It led the JIC, however, to note, ‘information about captured equipment is 
finite and we shall stand firm on the refusal to barter it with undertakings of 
more lasting significance’.35
By spring 1968, the British had become more circumspect in offering 
detailed appreciations of military equipment in which Israel had a clear inter-
est. In early April, the Israeli military attaché at London, Brigadier General Zvi 
Zamir – soon to become director general of Mossad – handed the DIS a list of 
items of particular interest to the IDF. These ranged from ‘spoofers’ to disrupt 
early warning radar, on-line tele-printers, ground surveillance radar, mortar 
locating radar through to various proximity fuses, and laser-range finders 
being developed for the new generation of Chieftain tanks, technology that, 
at the time, Britain was seen to have a comparative advantage. The British 
frowned on using an intelligence channel to pass on this request, telling Zamir 
that they regarded this appeal as a commercial transaction not an exchange of 
technical intelligence. Procedurally, the British were right, but an element of 
bureaucratic obfuscation was at play here. Pushing the Israeli request through 
commercial channels limited the quid pro quo involved in intelligence 
exchanges, forcing the DIS to keep Israel at arms-length. Perhaps sensing 
the real reason for the British insistence on adhering to accepted procedure, 
Zamir equally insisted that such requests be handled through intelligence 
channels, claiming that as officials from the DSTI had been given access to 
captured Soviet equipment, Israel had the ‘moral right to do so’.36
In the field of technical evaluation, sympathy for Israel’s position came at 
the highest level of the DIS. Its director-general, Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred 
Earle, believed that if British 105 mm tank ammunition supplied to the Israelis 
proved in anyway deficient in penetrating the armour of Soviet-supplied 
Egyptian tanks, this information should, as a matter of course, be shared 
with the Israelis. When approached by Zamir, Earle agreed that the exchange 
of research and development information between Israel and Britain should be 
comprehensive, ‘including the practical operational applications resulting 
from the evaluation of data thus acquired’.37
Personal relations between the DSTI and Israelis had in fact developed from 
the formal to the outright friendly. The British officials knew that the technical 
data that they could extrapolate from access to an array of captured Soviet 
equipment was unprecedented. Until this point, such technical intelligence 
had been piecemeal and largely dependent on the British Commanders-in- 
Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany based out of East Berlin. 
Moreover, despite clear divisions over when, not if, to extract a price from 
the British, the Israelis remained open to entertaining requests regarding 
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access to a range of Soviet equipment. The FCO, however, was keen to remind 
the DIS of official government policy. On 15 May 1968, a memorandum went 
to the MoD reminding DSTI staff that the JIC would evaluate requests for 
exchanges of intelligence and research and development.
All this is set against a background that the Israelis have in their possession large 
quantities of captured Soviet equipment, in which our own technical intelligence depart-
ments have a considerable interest. Our objective therefore is to co-operate with the 
Israelis so far as valuable information is made available to us, but without getting a one- 
sided bargain, contravening either our arms sales or release of military information 
policies, or engaging in wide ranging exchanges in sensitive fields which might seriously 
damage our relations with Arab states if they became known, and lead to renewed 
charges of a special relationship between our armed forces and those of Israel.38
But there were attempts at nurturing a closer relationship of sorts. Keen to 
extract as much as possible from the reservoir of Eastern bloc equipment, the 
British now agreed to send to Israel H.W Pout, the assistant chief scientific 
officer projects of the DSTI. An expert on guided weapon radar control 
systems, Pout was given clear instructions on what he could and could not 
discuss with the Israelis. He was under strict FCO instructions to ‘exclude 
from consideration nuclear matters and biological and chemical warfare’. The 
accompanying FCO instructions to the Pout mission noted that whilst 
exchange of conventional equipment could come on a case-by-case basis, 
Britain would not engage in any exchanges on ‘nuclear matters’ that might 
contribute towards developing Israeli technology in this field.39 Meanwhile, 
discussion on biological and chemical warfare was to remain, as much as 
possible, theoretical in nature, making clear to the Israelis that ‘there would be 
no question of collaboration with us contributing to the development by Israel 
of an offensive (B&C warfare) capacity’.40
Between 16 and 23 June 1968, Pout toured Israel’s main scientific and 
technical sites that either directly or indirectly dealt with weapons research 
and development. There is little doubt that Israel rolled out the proverbial red 
carpet. Escorted by Katchalsky, Pout met scientists, technicians, and senior 
MoD officials at the Weizman Institute, the Armament Development 
Authority, the Israeli Institute for Biological Research, the Office of the 
Chief Scientist, as well as Hebrew University in Tel Aviv. What he saw and 
heard impressed him, not just in terms of technical achievements of such 
a young country but the vigour and sheer energy witnessed all around him. His 
subsequent report to London was not only glowing in its praise but also made 
important policy recommendations that, if accepted, would have shifted the 
relationship with Israel beyond a purely functional exchange of technical 
intelligence based on national interests alone:
The constant threat from without, combined with the indefensible boundaries of the 
1949 armistice have given the country generally, and the Armed forces, an unequalled 
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sense of urgency, purpose, and unity. One is conscious of this at all time travelling about 
Israel and talking to the people, whether highly placed or the man in the street. After the 
Britain of 1968, a visit to Israel is a tonic.
He then added:
To base our sales policy on weapons of defence only would be tantamount to condemn-
ing Israel to defeat: even now, Israeli planning must be based on the brief, annihilating 
attack, although military advances are no longer a necessary part of the plan.41
Sentiment aside, hard economic calculations also played a part in his report. 
Israel’s technological feat in developing the Gabriel anti-ship missile system 
impressed him, even more so when he discovered that research and develop-
ment costs for the whole system was £4 million. His own estimate of the total 
costs for developing a system of equal complexity in Britain would have been 
£50 million and nearer £150 million in America. Such technological prowess 
moved Pout to recommend, ‘There would be considerable advantage in bring-
ing our establishments and industry into closer contact with development 
groups dedicated to economy and value for money’. A memorandum of 
understanding would define the type and scale of collaboration between 
British and Israeli scientists, perhaps including Electronic Counter Measures, 
tank design, anti-tank weapons, warhead design, propellants, and, controver-
sially given his brief, chemical and biological weapons focusing on ‘incapaci-
tating agents’ with Israel developing the ability to use chemical weapons to 
deter those of Egypt in attacking Israeli towns. Several Israeli scientists he met 
made the same point: ‘Gas used in Yemen was a mixture of mustard and 
V agent’, and Israel had to respond. Whilst detecting an element of hysteria, 
Pout noted, ‘In their position I would be bound to agree that the IDF must 
have an attack capability as a deterrent’.42
One curious element in Pout’s report was an apparent unease expressed by 
some Israeli scientists over the nature of ties to Washington. Whilst recognis-
ing that American generosity had been essential to their survival, ‘The Israelis 
regard themselves as essentially European in in character’ and that ‘charity is 
not the basis for the firm economic development of a nation’. This interpreta-
tion of Israel’s behaviour perhaps confused sentiment with the hardheaded 
pragmatism of decision-makers in Tel Aviv; whilst Israel was trying to link 
access to Soviet weaponry to greater collaboration with Britain in research and 
development, it was using the same leverage to draw a commitment from 
Washington on future arms sales. Facing the mainly Soviet armed and sup-
plied North Vietnamese army in Southeast Asia, the United States was despe-
rate for technical intelligence on Soviet weaponry, surface-to-air missiles, and 
their guidance systems being a particular priority. In August 1967, evaluation 
teams from the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and the American Defence 
Intelligence Agency [DIA] – collectively known as ‘Project MEXPO’ – 
acquired access by the IDF to what one report called ‘low priority items’. It 
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was clear to American intelligence officials, however, that the Israelis were 
‘holding out’ to await the results of parallel discussions on the result of 
weapons sales to Tel Aviv.43
In remains unknown is whether the DIS ever knew about these evaluation 
teams; Washington wanted to keep their activities on a need-to-know basis. 
Israel eventually softened its stance towards the MEXPO by January 1968, 
granting the CIA and DIA access to all the captured Soviet equipment 
requested. It remains unclear, however, if a reciprocal deal emerged at this 
stage for the purchase of the desired items of American equipment.44 Given 
that the Pout mission occurred after Project MEXPO concluded, Israel was 
still hedging its bets. Still, if Pout’s assessment of his hosts Europhilia intended 
to endear the JIC and FCO towards a warmer embrace of Israel, it failed. 
Whilst Pout was still in Israel, the MoD, under the guidance of the JIC, deemed 
research and development too sensitive to warrant further collaboration with 
Israel: communications equipment and guided weapons topped the list. The 
reason given had little to do with security and everything to do with commer-
cial gain. ‘It is not considered any useful purpose would be served by providing 
detailed information [to the Israelis] since the firms concerned [in Britain] 
would be unwilling to deal with Israel and thus jeopardise more lucrative Arab 
markets’.45
Equally, the FCO believed that the seemingly ad hoc Israeli approach in 
approaching various departments across Whitehall was deliberate. Across the 
vast machinery of government, there was suspicion amongst some officials 
that Israel hoped to either exploit any gaps in policy co-ordination, gain access 
to information withheld by one department, or get the better of any deal. This 
was a particular concern when it came to discussing chemical and biological 
weapons as well as nuclear ‘matters’. As one official opined:
One of the considerations which we have been concerned to emphasise from the start has 
been the necessity of close coordination [across Whitehall] to ensure that the exchange 
[of information with the Israelis] is a fair one. Given the piecemeal way in which the 
Israelis tend to approach different institutions and departments, this consideration will 
require to be borne firmly in mind.46
In the end, Pout’s enthusiastic support for greater research and development 
collaboration with Israel fell afoul of the FCO, the JIC effectively doing its 
bidding in preventing closer ties between the DSTI and its Israeli counterparts. 
Technical exchanges of information continued over the next year; Britain after 
all had agreed to sell its Chieftain tank, more powerful than the Centurion, to 
the IDF. Now preliminary discussions occurred over the possible sale of 60 
Royal Air Force [RAF] Hunter fighter aircraft as well as up to 50 Harrier 
ground attack jump jets, an aircraft of radical design and technology that was 
only just entering front-line service with the RAF. Harrier’s ability to take off 
from makeshift airfields or even become airborne through vertical take-off 
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capability was particularly appealing to the Israelis. Operating from relatively 
few runways – which as the IAF had demonstrated in 1967 could be vulnerable 
to a devastating first strike – the Harrier offered flexibility and survivability 
although it was designed as primarily as a ground attack aircraft rather than 
a fighter.47
Again, however, fears that such a sale might jeopardise arms sales to the wider 
Arab world and place British arms manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage 
if faced with an Arab boycott proved decisive. On the eve of a visit by the former 
Israeli chief of staff and now deputy defence minister, Lieutenant General Zvi 
Tzur, to London in February 1969, a briefing note spelling out de facto British 
arms sales policy effectively stymied any hope that the Israeli delegation may 
have entertained of concluding a deal. It is worth quoting at length:
From the professional point of view, there is a great interest in the way that in which the 
Israelis are dealing with their defence problems and the benefits from arms sales and, to 
a lesser extent, the exchanges of information cannot be disregarded. But in their context, 
our defence relations with Israel are of little importance compared to those with other 
states in the Near East. Israel has no defence facilities which we need and her enemies are 
not our enemies and some indeed are our friends. Closer defence links with Israel would 
be so easy to achieve and so welcome to her compared with the exasperation we [the UK] 
often find in trying to work with the Arabs, or even Iranians and Turks. Nevertheless, it 
is clear where our interests lie, and probably our responsibilities too: when we have to 
make a choice we cannot choose Israel. Our defence relations with Israel must be limited 
to achieving a balance which is clearly reasonable compared with our relations with other 
countries and especially the Arabs. Some visits by senior officers to Israel, some training 
of Israelis in this country, some co-operation in search and rescue between Israeli forces 
and the RAF in Cyprus: to go beyond this would be to seem to take sides in the 
controversy between Israel and the Arabs.48
Any Israeli illusions about where British interests lay were soon disabused. Not 
only did hopes of purchasing the Harrier prove a chimera, so did any hopes of 
purchasing the Chieftain tank. This deal collapsed by 1969. The British now 
claimed the sale of Chieftains would upset the military balance in the Middle 
East, whilst the Israelis suspected that fears over the potential impact on 
Britain’s trading relations with the wider Arab world remained the real 
cause. The subsequent sale of Chieftains to the Libyan government would 
suggest greater weight to the latter interpretation. The FCO preferred to hide 
behind adherence to a policy that only allowed the sale of ‘defensive’ equip-
ment to Israel whilst doing nothing that might undermine peace efforts led by 
Swedish diplomat, Gunnar Jarring, under the auspices of the United 
Nations.49 Even application of this stricture was selective: the Chieftain, with 
its heavy armour and massive 120 mm main gun, had after all constituted 
a defensive weapon system. It seems the defensive needs of Libya were more 
pressing than Israel’s despite the fact, on British insistence, that Tel Aviv 
maintained a studied silence regarding the purchase of the Chieftain lest it 
rankle policy-makers in Washington.50 The most surprising element perhaps 
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was that a Labour government led by Wilson, a premier otherwise known for 
his sympathy towards Israel, confirmed the Libyan sale. By 1970, Tel Aviv 
could look, but only occasionally touch, what London was prepared to offer.
A growing estrangement that began to mark Anglo-Israeli relations 
under Wilson’s Labour government continued apace after 1970 with the 
election of a new Conservative administration under Edward Heath. At 
a time when Britain’s well-being was increasingly dependent on Arab oil – 
the discovery of North Sea reserves had yet to come on stream – and 
London anxious to support a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that 
addressed the issue of Palestinian refugees, British policy looked to balance 
between continued support for Israel’s existence and support for 
Palestinian self-determination. The new foreign secretary, Alec Douglas 
Home, articulated this publicly during the so-called ‘Harrogate speech’, 
given to a meeting of Yorkshire Conservative Party members on 
31 October 1970. At that moment when there was no formal recognition 
of Israel by any group of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the speech 
was met with disdain in Tel Aviv, which sensed the continued influence of 
Foreign Office ‘Arabists’ behind Home’s words. The Scottish Labour MP 
and Zionist activist, Maurice Miller, provided a more pithy summation, 
noting, ‘Britain needs oil more than Jaffa oranges and it looks like this is 
the kind of thinking that will dominate the [Conservative] cabinet’.51
The exchange of intelligence continued, albeit on a limited basis, although 
there were exceptions where exigencies demanded as events in Jordan now 
proved. Faced with the growing militancy of armed Palestinian factions, 
notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, that threatened the 
Hashemite dynasty in Jordan, King Hussein unleashed his army against their 
redoubts in and around the capital Amman in September 1970. The MI6 
station chief in Amman, Jon ‘Bill’ Speares, before the events later known as 
‘Black September’, established a secure radio link with the Jordanian monarch. 
It now served as a conduit to pass IDF intelligence assessments to the 
Jordanians, a key source of information once Syrian forces looked to intervene 
on the side of the Palestinians.52
Still, London remained suspicious that Israel might seek to take advantage 
of the crisis and seize Jordanian territory that abutted the Golan Heights. Even 
so, and despite Jordanian requests for British – and American – airstrikes 
against Syrian forces, London demurred. Ultimately, Jordanian Armed Forces 
proved their worth, turning the tide against the Palestinian guerrillas and 
Syrian forces, thereby securing the monarchy. But the episode raised serious 
questions for London and Tel Aviv. The British might well have seen the 
survival of the monarch as a key strategic interest but lacked the military 
wherewithal, let alone the political will, to match words with deeds. In Israel, 
the debate amongst the leadership increasingly centred on whether to 
strengthen Hussein’s hand or allow Jordan effectively to become Palestine. 
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The intelligence passed to the king via Speares demonstrated Tel Aviv’s 
preference for the regional status quo. The view, however, that ‘Jordan is 
Palestine’ retained an appeal that continues to resonate amongst some ele-
ments of Israel’s political right to this day.53
Elsewhere, arranging military exchange visits occurred albeit on an ad hoc 
basis. In November 1971, for example, the IAF hosted a team of RAF officers 
over four days at the Ramat David air base. With both air forces now equipped 
with the American-built F4 Phantom fighter-bomber, the RAF were keen to 
learn from the tactical experience of the Israeli crews who had flown the 
aircraft against Soviet-equipped Egyptian forces in the recent War of 
Attrition and, in particular, how they had countered the surface-to-air 
[SAM] missile sites. These weapons equipped Warsaw Pact forces across 
Central Europe and, given its frontline role in West Germany, the RAF was 
keen to glean any information that could help counter this threat if the Cold 
War turned hot. IAF professionalism impressed the RAF officers involved, an 
admiration that convinced them of the need for further exchanges, a key 
recommendation of the post-visit report. It was not to be. By the time the 
October 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ war broke out, military exchanges between Israel 
and Britain were negligible, restricted to the work of their respective military 
attachés.54
In the October 1973 war, Israel again captured vast amounts of Soviet- 
supplied weapons and equipment from Syria and Egypt, much of it replacing 
the losses both had incurred following the 1967 hostilities. Much of this 
equipment had yet to enter frontline service with Warsaw Pact forces. The 
technical intelligence as well as the tactical and operational knowledge gained 
by the IDF in overcoming two armies equipped with this latest Soviet weap-
onry – the Sagger anti-tank missiles and Soviet SAM missiles – was self- 
evident to any Western intelligence professional.
Anticipating that the warmth in relations between the DSTI and their Israeli 
counterparts could be rekindled, ministers in the Heath government hoped 
that Israel would grant British technical experts access to some of the captured 
loot. The British defence secretary, Peter Carrington, was particularly vexed 
about the apparent success of Soviet SAM missiles downing Israel’s F4 
Phantoms. The effectiveness of Egyptian infantry in using the Sagger anti- 
tank wire-guided missiles to knock out so many Israeli tanks, including 
Centurions, in the first days of the war also struck Heath. The prime minister 
now queried Carrington if the BAOR struck the right balance between its 
armour and infantry units.55
The DIS director-general, Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly, asked the British 
military attaché in Tel Aviv to see if, in the war’s immediate aftermath, the 
Israelis would now co-operate in the ‘mutual exploitation of Soviet 
equipment’.56 But the limited returns of co-operating with the British on 
technical intelligence after June 1967 and, more presciently, London’s arms 
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embargo imposed on all sides in the conflict – including a moratorium on the 
use of British and Cypriot bases by United States Air Force planes flying 
resupply missions to Tel Aviv – were fresh in the Israeli collective memory. 
Moreover, Britain also imposed restrictions on American high altitude recon-
naissance flights operating from British bases during the war, insisting that Tel 
Aviv should not acquire any imagery intelligence resulting from these 
operations.57 British perfidy proven saw access denied. Also dashed were 
hopes that some crumbs of technical comfort might come from the 
Americans. Still smarting from Heath’s decision to deny the use of British 
airbases, Washington was in no mood to do London’s bidding with the 
Israelis.58
Moreover, with Israel increasingly dependent on American manufactured 
arms and equipment, London had no leverage that it could realistically use in 
the realm of research and development to gain access, an area that marked 
a clear Israeli need for co-operation and collaboration in the aftermath of 
June 1967 war. As the newly formed ‘Middle East War Aftermath Intelligence 
Coordinating Committee’ in Whitehall reported in November 1973, the 
British were now set to miss ‘potentially the greatest source of intelligence 
on Soviet equipment and tactical doctrine ever presented to the Western 
world’. Not only were the DIS prevented from touching, they could not even 
look.59 The role reversal was striking, marking a decisive shift in the power 
relationship between the Israeli supplicant and the British supplier and where 
London’s voice now counted for very much less.
Perhaps the most damning account of British policy resides in the published 
memoirs of former Labour foreign secretary, David Owen. Condemning both 
Heath and Home for refusing to allow the supply of tank shells for the British- 
made Centurion tanks crucial to Israel’s war effort, he opined, ‘It showed not 
just Arab influence within the Foreign Office but a total lack of principle in 
standing by one’s commitments . . . . British influence with Israel never 
recovered, for perfectly understandable reasons. It was a craven act which 
had everything to do with the threat of being cut off from Arab oil and for 
which I had nothing but contempt’.60 Relations did not improve nine years 
after the Yom Kippur war by disclosures that Israel continued to sell military 
equipment to Argentina both during and after the 1982 Falklands War. The 
argument put forward by Tel Aviv that such military exports were crucial to its 
balance of payments echoed the very arguments used by Whitehall in weighing 
the value of arms sales to the Arab Middle East.61 Not until the visit to Israel in 
1986 by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did intelligence relations return to 
anything like that warm, albeit brief, transactional glow experienced in the 
immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war.62
Today, the Anglo-Israeli intelligence relationship is probably as close as it 
has ever been and across a range of activities, from counter-terrorism to efforts 
to disrupt Iran’s regional ambitions, including in the nuclear realm.63 
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Moreover, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq saw British Armed Forces buy Israeli 
military equipment, notably the Heron ‘Watchkeeper’ drone and Popeye 
missile system, to plug gaps in capability that would otherwise have limited 
British military operations. Equally, when first deployed in Afghanistan in 
2002, the British army drew heavily on Israeli expertise, mainly from IDF 
operations in southern Lebanon, in how to deal with threats from suicide 
bombers and Improvised Explosive Devices.64 Elsewhere, the Government 
Communications Headquarters [GCHQ], alongside the United States 
National Security Agency [NSA], has shared information with their Israeli 
counterpart, Unit 8200 – also referred to as Israel’s Intelligence Signals 
National Unit – presumably on shared targets of interest across the Middle 
East, notably Iran and its nuclear programme.65 If such a thing as a golden age 
of Anglo-Israeli intelligence and defence co-operation exists, it is probably 
occurring now.66
Israel, however, remains an intelligence target for both the United States 
and Britain. In January 2016, the release of material by Edward Snowden on 
Wikileaks revealed that GCHQ and the NSA had co-operated for over 
a decade on ‘Operation Anarchist’, allowing both agencies to hack into the 
video feeds of IAF aircraft and drones on operational flights. For Israel, it was 
a major security breach; for the British and American crypto-analysts, it was 
a real coup, allowing the gathering of real-time information on IDF military 
operations and, most important, offering a priceless forewarning of any Israeli 
intent to launch pre-emptive strikes designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear 
programme.67 It is a salutary reminder that the path of Anglo-Israeli relations, 
not least in the realm of intelligence sharing, has rarely been smooth.68
Competing regional interests have often led to estrangement, with the 
shared antipathies towards Cairo in the 1960s producing a brief period of co- 
operation as both London and Tel Aviv looked to clip Nasser’s wings. But 
commercial gain and London’s determination to protect existing interests and 
develop others across the Arab Middle East saw British and Israeli interests 
quickly diverge by 1970. In this process, the FCO often exercised the greatest 
influence across Whitehall and, in particular, the JIC. By contrast, professional 
interest as well as admiration for Israel’s victory in June 1967 saw the MoD and 
DSTI adopt a more benign attitude towards Israel’s military needs. In the 
hierarchy of power, however, the DIS was always the poor relation in influen-
cing policy, unable to compete with the FCO – and likely MI6 – in drafting JIC 
assessments. In most matters relating to the Middle East, ministers usually 
deferred to their trained diplomats.
To be sure, certain areas always remained beyond the pale in the realm of 
technical intelligence sharing with Israel. Collaboration over nuclear, chemi-
cal, and biological warfare remained taboo, despite the best efforts of the Pout 
report to elicit some change in JIC attitudes. One could ask if an opportunity 
for greater defence collaboration was lost, pushing Tel Aviv towards 
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Washington and denying crucial political leverage to London in the wider 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Perhaps the trajectory of Israel’s military ties to the 
United States had already been set with the sale of Hawk missiles under the 
Kennedy Administration and soon after with the deal to supply Israel with 
Skyhawk jets. The access given to Project MEXPO that pre-dated the Pout visit 
also underscored that shift.
Still, the Anglo-Israeli intelligence relationship highlights a wider truth. 
Whilst the idea of democratic peace largely negates violent conflict 
between states defined by open government, the competing interests of 
Israel and Britain across the Middle East made for an uneasy relationship. 
Israel’s perception of its existential needs ran counter to a Britain seeking 
to shore up an ailing economy. Of course, British influence across the 
region was in decline, its moment in the Middle East as described by the 
historian, Elizabeth Monroe, long passed. Britain tried to punch above its 
weight but, by 1967, its interests were undoubtedly rooted in commercial 
advantage rather than strategic assets gained. The aftermath of the 
October 1973 war was testament to this fact. British intelligence and, in 
particular, the DIS, admired Israel’s military achievements and saw the 
value in sharing technical intelligence aimed at bolstering the British 
Armed Forces. But the competing interests identified above could never 
be reconciled. A shared cultural tradition, the very essence of the ‘Five 
Eyes’ alliance, was conspicuous by its absence. Moreover, if a reciprocity of 
sorts defined Anglo-Israeli intelligence relations between 1967 and 1974, it 
was defined by ‘the reciprocity of barter’, a reciprocity still to emerge fully 
from the shadows of the Palestine mandate. To paraphrase Lord 
Palmerston’s famous quip, not all democratic states in an intelligence 
relationship become close friends. Rather, they become nodding acquain-
tances who, more often than not, come together by the shared pursuit of 
short-term interests.69
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